This paper uses a rich panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing rms (1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)) and a propensity score reweighting estimator to show that multinational rms acquire the most productive domestic rms, which, on acquisition, conduct more product and process innovation (simultaneously adopting new machines and organizational practices) and adopt foreign technologies, leading to higher productivity. We propose a model of endogenous selection and innovation in heterogeneous rms that jointly explains the observed selection process and the innovation decisions. Further, we show in the data that innovation on acquisition is associated with the increased market scale provided by the parent rm.
Introduction
The pervasiveness of the large and persistent productivity advantages held by certain rms within narrowly dened industries is a well-established fact that continues to intrigue researchers (see surveys by Syverson, 2010; Ichniowski and Shaw, 2010) . One salient example that has attracted much attention in several di erent elds is that multinational subsidiaries generally outperform domestic rms. 1 Many have argued that this is because multinationals transfer superior technologies and organizational practices -in the form of new product and process innovation -to their foreign subsidiaries. 2 However, since the most prevalent form of multinational entry is through acquisition, rather than through greeneld investment (89 percent in developed countries -Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004), their superior performance could be due to the selection of higher-performing domestic rms. To date, little is known about the economic determinants driving the extent of innovation and technology transfer upon acquisition or about which domestic rms are selected to become foreign subsidiaries. In this paper, we use a unique panel dataset to analyze both the selection and innovation decisions of multinational rms and propose a new mechanism explaining how these decisions are jointly determined. We argue that one cannot fully understand the relationship between foreign ownership and innovation without explicitly recognizing that the incentives for innovation -to increase rm productivity -and the incentives for foreign acquisition are inherently interdependent.
The data used contain information on an array of internal technological and organizational choices, as well as on foreign ownership and productivity, for around 1,800 Spanish manufacturing rms between 1990 and 2006. 3 The main distinguishing feature of our data is that we can directly observe di erent productivity-enhancing actions taken within the rm and, hence, do not have to rely on arguably imperfect productivity estimates to show the impact of acquisition. We are able
to study precisely what types of innovation the acquired rms implement, such as whether they undertake product or process innovation, assimilate foreign technologies, purchase new machinery or introduce new organizational practices. We identify our e ects by looking at within-rm variation in innovation, using the panel structure of the dataset. In addition, to control for time-varying selection and other sources of endogeneity, we implement a propensity score reweighting estimator to estimate the average treatment e ect of foreign acquisition on innovation (Imbens, 2004 ; Busso,
DiNardo and McCrary, 2009).
We rst analyze which domestic rms are more likely to be the target of acquisition, a largely unexplored question in the international economics literature. 4 Empirically, our data reveal clear evidence of positive selection: foreign rms buy the most productive rms within industries, i.e.
they "cherry-pick." This contrasts with a large strand of the corporate nance merger literature, which asserts that low-performing rms are the most likely to be acquired (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1992 ; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) . Further, we nd that accounting for the positive selection leads to a labor productivity premium associated with foreign acquisition that is one third of the cross-sectional estimate. 5 Nonetheless, after accounting for selection, rm sales increase by 18 percent, labor productivity by 13 percent and total factor productivity by 16 percent following
acquisition.
Next, we analyze the type of productivity-enhancing innovations acquired rms implement following acquisition. After controlling for selection using rm xed e ects and the propensity score reweighting estimator, we nd that acquisition leads to improvements in rm technology: acquired rms are more likely to engage in process innovation and product innovation. 6 In addition, they are more likely to assimilate new foreign technologies, which suggests that technology is being transferred from the parent to the subsidiary. We are also able to explore a distinction that has long been present in the literature about di erent types of process innovation. Teece (1977) distinguishes between two types of technology transfer in his seminal study of 26 U.S. multinational subsidiaries: The rst is "hardware" such as tooling, equipment, and blue prints. The second is the information that must be acquired if this hardware is to be used e ectively -the required methods of organization. 7 Our results indicate that rms do both simultaneously upon acquisition -i.e., they 4 Existing literature in international economics focuses on which parent rms will chose to engage in FDI (Helpman et al. 2004 ; Burstein and Monge-Naranjo, 2009). Yeaple (2007, 2008) model the mode of foreign entry -greeneld or acquisition -as a function of parent rm characteristics. In contrast, we focus on which domestic rms are acquired. 5 Relatedly, Criscuolo and Martin (2009) show that the observed U.S. multinational productivity advantage is driven mainly by selection. Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Ramondo (2009) also document positive selection in Indonesia and Chile, respectively. 6 These ndings are consistent with Arnold and Javorcik (2009) , who establish that total investment and investment in new machinery increases under foreign ownership for Indonesian rms. In contrast, Stiebale and Reize (2010) nd no evidence of foreign acquisition a ecting innovation activities in German rms. 7 In the literature on the market for corporate control, Jensen and Ruback (1980) argue that the potential synergies prompting e cient mergers could occur through the adoption of more e cient production or organizational technology. More recently, Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) show that the subsidiaries of multinational rms exhibit purchase new machines and adopt new methods of organizing production at the same time, rather than doing either on its own. This is consistent with the nding that it is optimal for rms to implement new information technology and organizational practices jointly, identied by a number of authors (Black and The observed positive selection and technology upgrading upon acquisition are consistent with the predictions of a simple model in which the optimal amount of innovation upon acquisition depends on the initial characteristics of the acquired subsidiary and the costs and benets of the innovation process; in turn, the returns to innovation following acquisition determine which rms are acquired. We use the model to illustrate how the selection and innovation decisions are jointly determined and to interpret the empirical results.
In our model, there is a complementarity between the extent of innovation and the acquired rm's initial characteristics reected in its initial productivity. This could arise for several reasons. For example, a product upgrade is more valuable when the acquired rm is able to sell more units of the good. Additionally, the benets associated with a superior production process depend on the skill of the operators, and, more generally, on the "absorptive capacity" of the acquired subsidiary (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) . We show in the model that the complementarity between innovation and the acquired rm's initial productivity is amplied when the foreign parent brings lower innovation costs or greater market access. 8 A foreign rm could bring with it lower innovation costs if it has a lower cost of capital (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004) or access to proprietary technologies (Caves, 1996) , but it could also bring larger benets of innovation. Multinational rms are known to provide access to export markets for acquired subsidiaries (as shown by Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2005) for vertical and by Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007) for horizontal foreign direct investment), thereby increasing rm scale. With either lower innovation costs or greater market access, the model explains both positive selection and increased innovation.
We explore empirically the role of greater market scale granted by the foreign parent in driving innovation decisions. We nd that the higher levels of innovation by foreign subsidiaries are, in large part, driven by rms that export through a foreign parent. This is consistent with foreign ownership more sophisticated managerial practices than domestic rms across the U.S., Europe and Asia. 8 The complementarity between innovation and market scale is a major theme of the international economics literature. For example, the promise of greater sales in export markets creates an incentive for a rm to invest in productivity-enhancing technologies (Verhoogen, 2008; Bustos, 2010 facilitating access to larger markets and thereby creating incentives to invest in rm technology. We are able to determine the role of the export channel, as distinct from export status, because rms in our data are asked how they access export markets and, specically, whether they export through a foreign parent -either using the parent's distribution channels or selling directly to another entity within the multinational. Our ndings provide strong evidence that multinationals enjoy greater benets from innovation due to their existing market scale and not just innovation costs that are lower than domestic rms'. The fundamental link between foreign ownership -in particular, the increase in market access that comes with foreign ownership -and innovation is absent from the existing studies of trade and innovation, as well as from the literature on organizational structure and productivity.
Notice that our empirical results rule out an alternative view of the process of technology transfer -namely, that multinational subsidiaries adopt the same technology level as the foreign parent, independent of their initial productivity. 9 If a multinational were able to transplant its own productivity to any acquired rm, the value added through acquisition would be largest for lowproductivity rms, leading to negative selection, that is, multinationals would select to acquire the least productive rms. to their technology and organization; they sometimes introduced new products, and their market share and/or exports generally increased. 10 The results in this paper on positive selection and increased productivity upon acquisition have direct implications for the relationship between multinational activity and the evolution of the productivity distribution. For rms that become foreign-owned, the productivity distribution shifts to the right. Since our results suggest that multinationals do not purchase a random selection of rms but are likely to acquire the initially most productive rms, productivity di erences across rms in the economy can be amplied over time. Establishing the mechanism driving multinational entry into a country and subsequent investment decisions is also key for welfare analysis. Intuitively, if entering rms acquire the most productive rms in an industry, the increase in productivity associated with any increase in inward FDI is likely to be lower than if foreign rms acquired the least productive rms and brought them up to international productivity levels. Our paper, therefore, informs the set of assumptions behind macroeconomic models of multinational production and welfare.
Finally, accounting for the links between the innovation and acquisition decisions can shed light on why foreign multinationals acquire larger rms and on the long-standing puzzle of why some rms innovate more than others. Our study suggests that both are determined by the variable costs and benets of technology transfer. When this is the case, our key insight is that di erences in market access alone, and not just in foreign rms' innovation cost advantages, can explain these phenomena. More generally, the fact that rms within an industry may have di erential access to markets provides a new rationale for why initial di erences in productivity persist, and why not all rms invest in technology and organizational upgrades, which are fundamental questions within the organizational economics eld among others (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Syverson, 2010) .
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines a simple model illustrating the relationship between acquisition and investment to frame the empirical analysis; Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and results related to the acquisition decision; Section 5 focuses on the innovation decision and explores the role of the market access mechanism in driving our main results. Section 6 analyzes the e ect of foreign acquisition on productivity.
Section 7 concludes.
Acquisition and Innovation Decisions
In this section, we set up a simple industry-level partial equilibrium model to illustrate the endogenous choices of foreign acquisition and innovation when domestic rms di er in initial productivity, and the complementarities that can emerge among productivity, innovation and acquisition. 
Structure
Consider a model with heterogeneous domestic rms (Melitz, 2003) with a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) demand structure and increasing returns to scale in a setting of monopolistic competition (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) . The initial productivity of rm is given by Forward-looking foreign rms select which domestic rms to acquire, and all rms choose a level of innovation or other productivity-increasing investment, . Production and prots reect postinnovation productivity levels, , and the rm's marginal cost is given by 1 .
12
The price set by each rm is a constant markup over marginal cost, and each variety in an industry is produced by a single rm. 
1,
assumed to be constant across all markets. 13 Each rm sells ( ) units, generating revenues
where is a measure of market size for the markets relevant to rm . The prots generated by each rm are given by:
To simplify, we denote = ³ 1 ´ , and work with an increasing transformation of the innovation level = 1 from now on. The value, , of each rm operating in the domestic market (net of the xed production cost) is equal to the variable prot it earns, , less the total cost of innovations to increase productivity ( ):
12 The model's predictions are robust to specifying post-innovation productivity as an additive function of initial productivity and innovation; ( + ). The multiplicative setup used here is similar to the model in Bustos (2010) , where the binary decision about technology investment is related to the export decision. In our case, rms choose whether to invest, but, in addition, they also optimize over the level of investment as a function of innovation costs. Heterogeneous rm productivities could reect variation in marginal costs for rms using the same technologies or variation in the quality of output produced, allowing more productive rms to charge higher prices. 13 The representative consumer's utility function is given by = [ R
where (0 1). The demand for a particular variety of the product sold by a given rm is ( ) = ( ( ) ) where is total expenditure in the relevant market for good on all varieties in the industry, and is a weighted average of variety prices in the relevant market. The subindex on and captures the fact that rms can sell in di erent markets. We assume that doing so does not incur transport costs. We dene = 1 See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) for further details.
The Innovation Decision
We allow the total cost of investment in productivity to be the sum of a xed and a variable cost of innovation:
where measures the improvement in productivity following the investment. We do not impose any specic functional form on ( ). 14 At any given point in time, there is an upper bound on the level of technology that a rm can attain by innovating that represents the "state of the art" technology in a given industry. We denote this productivity level max .
The rm chooses a level of innovation that maximizes the value of the rm. When the optimal level of innovation is at an interior solution, which we refer to as Case 1 in what follows, the rm innovates up to the level where the marginal benet equals marginal cost:
Equation (2) shows that, ceteris paribus, at an interior solution, = ( ) a rm with a higher initial productivity level , greater market size , or lower costs of technology investment , will make a greater investment in productivity. ( ) is the value of at which a rm with a low (high) value of ³ ´w ould nd it worthwhile to invest in innovation. 14 We require only that the technology total cost function ( ) has a continuous rst derivative and is strictly positive whenever 1. Notice that we do not impose a technological complementarity between innovation and initial productivity which could reect an assumption that absorptive capacity is increasing in . One way to do this would be to specify as a decreasing function of . The current specication is general enough to include this possibility. 15 This rst order condition gives the optimal level of investment when is su ciently high that the rm does not nd it optimal to innovate up to max . This is for
To ensure positive innovation, must be su ciently low so that rm value under (optimal) investment is larger than rm value under no investment. This is true when (( 1) 0 ( ) ( ). In the interior optimum 1, (since 0 | 1 = 1 0 (1) 0 as 0 (1) = 0 where we have imposed marginal cost continuity). The interior optimum is guaranteed to be a maximum as long as marginal cost (or, equivalently, 0 ) is a continuous increasing function of . For to be unique, 0 should also be strictly increasing for 1. 16 The rst order condition (2) does not separately identify and . Access to larger markets and lower marginal costs of investment in technology have similar e ects on the choice of . Either assumption is su cient.
The solution in Case 1 takes into account the costs and benets of innovation and the rm's initial productivity to determine the interior solution. However, a common assumption in the literature on multinational production is that subsidiaries operate at the same productivity level as their parent, independent of their initial characteristics. We represent this possible assumption on the technology transfer process by allowing for any acquired rm to nd it optimal to innovate up to the "state of the art" technology level, and refer to this special case as Case 2 in what follows.
This could arise if productivity-enhancing innovation incurred only a xed cost, i.e. = 0, in which case the optimal innovation is at a corner solution for all initial levels of productivity. This
, which is a decreasing function of initial productivity. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the relationship between and in this case (represented by in the gure).
Unlike in Figure 1 , the amount of innovation is independent of .
The Acquisition Decision
We denote as the value of the rm, given by equation (1), at the optimal investment level for rm . We now turn to how foreign ownership a ects innovation and rm value under each case governing the innovation process and, hence, how foreign rms select whom to acquire.
We allow foreign acquisition to a ect two model parameters. The trade literature has shown that foreign ownership provides access to larger markets. If measures the size of the domestic market, we allow foreign-acquired rms to have access to an additional larger market, (denoted ) so that the total market for a foreign-acquired rm is = + , where . Foreign ownership may also bring with it lower innovation costs (access to proprietary technologies, lower costs of nancing, etc.) such that or (these costs can remain at their original level or fall). We assume throughout that 0 and, for simplicity, that the domestic rm is always at the interior solution given by the rst order condition in equation (2) .
Given the parameter values relevant for the ownership structure of the rm, the optimal level of innovation under foreign ownership is , and under domestic ownership is . Using equation
(1) for rm value under each ownership structure, the incremental value of the rm under foreign acquisition can be written as:
Under the assumptions that , and , and at least one of these inequalities is strictly true, expression (3) is positive.
¡ ¢ represents the value created by the acquisition.
We assume that the price paid by a foreign rm if it were to acquire rm , , divides the value created through the acquisition between the buyers and the sellers. This assumption underpins the theory of e ciency-based M&A activity (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987) , and suggests that
is the share of the surplus going to the domestic owners of the rm and is the share going to the acquiring parent.
[0 1] can be thought of as reecting the relative bargaining weights of each party in the transaction. 17 We assume that there is a xed cost to a foreign rm of making an acquisition, , representing the xed search and administrative costs related to the acquisition process.
The model predicts that a rm is acquired in anticipation of a positive future payo to the acquiring rm, whenever
That is, the foreign rm has an incentive to make an acquisition whenever:
Now we can investigate the relationship between acquisition incentives and initial rm productivity. The nature of this relationship depends on the process by which is determined.
In Case 1, the optimal amount of innovation satises the rst order condition given in equation (2) . 18 Applying the envelope theorem to the value of the rm under foreign and domestic control
That is, the value created by foreign acquisition is increasing in initial productivity, and more productive domestic rms are more likely to be acquired. This result arises from the complementarity between foreign rm characteristics (larger markets and/or lower costs of innovation), innovation and the acquired rm's productivity. A given innovation is more valuable in more productive rms; and this value is greater under foreign control due to, for instance, the access to distribution networks granted by the foreign rm, which means that the innovation can be leveraged in a larger market and, hence, is more protable.
An alternative scenario emerges if the process by which is determined is governed by Case 2, when multinationals nd it optimal to transplant their own superior level of technology, max regardless of who they buy. In this scenario, the value of the rm under foreign ownership,
, is independent of its initial characteristics and, in particular, independent of . This means that there are no sources of complementarity between the characteristics of the acquired rm and the implemented technology. Since the value of the rm had it remained under domestic control,
, is an increasing function of , the value added by acquisition is decreasing in ,
, and less productive domestic rms are more likely to be acquired.
In our model, the identity of the acquiring rm is irrelevant for the optimal choice of innovation.
We require only the possibility that the parent brings a lower cost of innovation and/or a larger market than the rm would have had under domestic control. Hence, heterogeneity among parents does not a ect the predictions arising in the model for innovation and acquisition decisions. initial productivity and innovation within an industry for a given . In Figure 1 , rms above e 1 are acquired and innovate; rms between and e 1 remain domestic and innovate; and rms below remain domestic and do not make any investments. In Figure 2 , rms below e 2 are acquired and implement the innovation required to raise the productivity level of the acquired rm to max . Firms above e 2 remain domestic, and the most productive of these may choose optimally to innovate.
Data Description
The results in this paper are based on the Encuesta de Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE) Our data span the years 1990 to 2006. 83.5 percent of the rms are domestic in the rst year 19 A natural extension of the paper would be to examine the implications of the mechanism for bilateral FDI ows and the resulting assortative matching between heterogeneous foreign parents and domestic rms. 20 Details on the survey characteristics and data access guidelines can be obtained at http://www.funep.es/esee/sp/sinfo_que_es.asp. they appear in the data, and 16.5 percent are foreign-owned. We dene a rm as foreign-owned if it reports that a foreign company owns at least 50 percent of its capital. 91 percent of rms report either being 0 or 100 percent foreign-owned. Since 50 percent is a su cient indicator for foreign control, we have favored this denition of "acquisition" (the results are robust to specifying other thresholds). Markusen (2002) denes foreign direct investment through acquisition as an investment in which the rm acquires a substantial controlling interest in a foreign rm. We restrict our sample to rms that are not owned by a foreign company in the rst year they appear in the data, since the model generates predictions about which domestic rms will be acquired. The data do not record any further characteristics of the parent rm. However, our dataset is unique in that, in addition to recording ownership status, it reports a large number of variables that reect the productivity-enhancing innovation activity undertaken by each rm. The data include variables indicating whether the rm undertook process innovation, product innovation, and whether the rm made e orts to assimilate foreign technologies in a given year.
The variables recorded in our data allow us to distinguish between process innovation related to the introduction of new machinery and new methods to organize production, reecting the distinction in Teece (1977) . The ESEE bases its survey questions on an OECD publication, the Oslo Manual, which was designed to formalize guidelines for collecting and using data on industrial innovation. It acknowledges the ne line between an organizational innovation and other types of process innovation by noting that "a starting point for distinguishing process and/or organizational innovations is the type of activity". In particular, "organizational innovations deal primarily with people and the organization of work." Accordingly, the ESEE asks respondents whether their rm has undertaken a process improvement that involves the use of new machines and/or the use of new methods to organize production. Some examples of the latter are "practices to improve knowledge sharing," "education and training systems," "new methods for distributing responsibilities and decision making" and "management systems for general production or supply operations."
The data also contain other information on the activities of these rms that will allow us to shed light on the mechanisms at work in our model. In particular, we know whether a rm exports and its volume of exports. Importantly, we also observe whether the rm uses the foreign parent as a channel for its exports, or via other means (this information is available only every four years).
We do not know of any other dataset that includes all these detailed variables for a large panel of rms over an extended period of time (17 years in our data).
We also use the ESEE data to dene three di erent variables that measure rm productivity. The rst is the natural log of the rm's real sales, relative to the industry mean (similar to Verhoogen, 2008 ). The second is labor productivity dened as the natural logarithm of real value added per worker, relative to the industry mean (similar to Lileeva and Treer, 2010) . The third is Total Factor Productivity (TFP) obtained using the method outlined in Olley and Pakes (1996) . 21 The ESEE categorizes rms into 20 industries, based on the two-digit NACE classication. Summary statistics are given in Table 1 , and variable denitions are included in the notes to this table.
4 The Acquisition Decision
Estimation Strategy
The rst set of predictions arising from the model sheds light on which domestic rms are likely to be the targets of foreign acquisitions. As we saw in Section 2, two very di erent selection mechanisms can arise as a function of the process through which the level of innovation is determined upon acquisition. In Case 1, foreign rms acquire the most productive rms in the economy (those with higher ), so that there is positive selection. In Case 2, foreign rms transfer their own productivity level to the domestic rm, regardless of who they buy. Under this innovation process, there will be negative selection: foreign rms acquire the least productive rms (those with lower ).
We estimate the type of selection at work in the data in the following way. Rearranging inequality (4), we denote = ¡ ¢ . The binary outcome of the acquisition decision can be seen as reecting a threshold rule for the underlying latent variable , so that = 1 if 0 and = 0 if 0. We also allow the average probability of acquisition to vary by year and industry by including year ( ) and industry ( ) dummies. Given these assumptions, the probability that a given rm in industry is acquired in year can be estimated with the following linear approximation:
We will rst measure as the productivity of rm in the base year (the rst year the rm appears in the data, which we subsequently exclude from the analysis). We then allow for a timevarying measure of productivity, , -namely, lagged productivity. Empirically, lagged and initial 21 The Olley-Pakes (1996) approach and other frequently-used solutions to the endogeneity of input levels to unobserved productivity shocks in calculating the values of factor coe cients in measures of TFP rely on the assumption that productivity evolves as an AR (1) process. To the extent that this approach does not allow rms to choose the optimal level of investment in productivity-enhancing technology as a function of observable characteristics, it is less well-suited to our research question. This is why we chose to present three productivity measures. productivity are highly positively correlated, but the ordering of rms based on lagged productivity may better reect the attractiveness of any one rm at the time of potential purchase.
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the rm is foreign-owned in period . A probit model gives similar results to the linear probability model.
In Case 1, b is predicted to be positive. In contrast, in Case 2, with negative selection, b is expected to be negative. Note that the observed selection e ect o ers insight about the actual nature of the potential technology transfer from multinational parents to domestic subsidiaries.
Foreign rms select the most productive domestic rms
Before turning to the regression analysis, we rst use our dataset to explore the patterns of selection graphically. Figure 3 plots the distribution of initial productivity for two groups of rms: those that are acquired by a foreign rm four years after our baseline productivity is computed and those that remain domestic. One can clearly see that the distribution of acquired rms (solid line) lies to the right of those that remain domestic. Since our measure of productivity is demeaned relative to the industry, this does not reect di erences in rm size by industry. Figure 4 reproduces Figure 3 by industry. A striking pattern emerges: positive selection is present in every industry. These two gures provide prima facie evidence that the positive selection predicted by Case 1 in our model dominates in the Spanish data.
We now turn to a more systematic regression analysis and estimate equation (5) to establish this rst fact. The results are shown in Panels A and B of Table 2 . The dependent variable in all columns is the indicator for foreign ownership, and this is regressed on our three proxies for initial productivity. These are the logarithm of real rm sales (Columns 1 to 3), the logarithm of labor productivity (Columns 4 to 6) and the logarithm of TFP (Columns 7 to 9), all relative to their industry mean. All regressions include time dummies, industry dummies, and industry trends, so they can be interpreted as within-industry di erences in the probability of acquisition as a function of initial productivity, controlling for possible di erential trends in acquisitions by industry. The regressions in Panel A use baseline (initial) productivity measured by these three variables, while those in Panel B use the lagged value of the productivity measures.
Regardless of the productivity measure used, we nd that more productive rms are more likely to become foreign-owned. For example, the coe cient of 0.0228 in Column 1a implies that, conditional on being domestic in any given year, one standard deviation higher initial sales is associated with a 3.9 percentage points higher probability of being acquired the year after. The coe cient (0.0226) is very similar in Column 1b, which uses lagged sales, reecting the fact that these two measures are highly correlated. Given that 4.6 percent of all the rms in our sample of initially domestic rms become owned eventually, this explains a signicant fraction of the crosssectional variation in acquisition probabilities. 22 Columns 2, 5 and 8 do not restrict the relationship between initial productivity and acquisition to being linear and replace the productivity variable with indicator variables capturing the productivity quartile the rm is in. For example, in Column 2a, which uses initial productivity measured by sales, being in the second quartile increases the probability of being foreign-owned by 2.5 (1.5
in Column 2b, using lagged sales) percentage points relative to rms in the rst quartile; being in the third quartile by four percentage points (4.01 in Column 2b); and being in the highest productivity quartile by 9.9 percentage points (9.6 in Column 2b). A similar pattern emerges when using labor productivity or TFP as the productivity measure. Therefore, rms at the upper end of the productivity distribution are substantially more likely to become foreign-owned, and the e ect is increasing in rm productivity, with the upper quartile having a much higher probability of acquisition. So, overall, even though some rms may be acquired because of their exporter status, positive selection persists, and multinationals are more likely to acquire the most productive rms among both exporters and non-exporters. Table 2 , therefore, reinforces the results from Figures 3 and 4 and shows that, within our cross-section of rms, the more productive domestic rms are more likely to become foreign-owned -evidence of positive selection and the presence of "cherry-picking." These selection patterns are inconsistent with a model in which foreign rms always nd it optimal to transfer their superior 22 Table 1 shows that 3.5 percent of our observations are rms under foreign ownerhsip. This corresponds to the 4.6 percent of rms being acquired during the sample (that appear in the data both before and after acquisition). Criscuolo and Martin, 2009) , to the best of our knowledge, no prior studies have explained this empirical regularity. When viewed within the context of our model, our nding suggests that acquisition patterns reect an underlying complementarity between the initial productivity of the acquired rm and the extent of innovation post-acquisition. As we will see later, this nding has signicant implications for the relationship between multinational activity in a country and the evolution of the productivity distribution.
The Innovation Decision

Estimation Strategy: Fixed E ects and Propensity Score
After having established that foreign rms positively select domestic rms as targets, we now test the set of predictions relating productivity-enhancing investments to acquisition -namely, that upon being acquired, foreign subsidiaries invest more in innovation than they would have done had they remained domestic. Our model suggests that in either Case 1 or Case 2 -and therefore regardless of whether selection is positive or negative -acquired rms undertake more investment activity, controlling for the initial productivity of the acquired rm. This can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 as the di erence between and
In Case 1, the optimal level of investment under each ownership structure is determined by the rst-order condition given in equation (2) . In this case, innovation can increase upon acquisition for several reasons. The foreign rm could provide access to a larger market and/or bring with it lower innovation costs, such that ( ) ( ) . In Case 2, foreign rms transfer their own superior level of technology to the domestic rm upon acquisition. This means that innovation will increase upon acquisition.
Our innovation variables are based on the rm-level responses to the questions of whether the rm made specic types of innovation in that year, which we interpret as improvements to rm technology. We are interested in how the rm's technology, which is the result of successive innovations, changes with foreign ownership. Since at any point in time, the rm's technology can be characterized as the sum of innovations made up to that point, we use the yearly variables on rm-level innovation described in Section 3 to measure the rm's technology at time as:
where 0 is the year the rm entered the data. 23 Any di erences in technology across rms in the year they enter the data will be captured by the rm xed e ects in our empirical specications.
As a result, all the variation in a rm's innovative activity, and the resulting technology level, that we relate to changes in the rm's ownership structure is variation that occurs within the sample. 24 Empirically, we rst estimate the e ect of acquisition on technology using the panel structure of the dataset and including year xed e ects as follows:
where is a proxy for productivity-enhancing innovation. The fact that the level of productivity a ects investment directly for foreign-owned rms is absorbed by the rm xed e ects, along with any other permanent unobserved characteristics of rms. Including rm xed e ects, , implies that the estimated parameter b is a measure of the change in investment after being acquired, controlling for the fact that foreign rms select to acquire higher initial productivity rms, and this is predicted to be positive.
The xed e ects specication controls for selection based on time-invariant rm characteristics (e.g., initial productivity). However, it is important in the context of our 17-year panel to acknowledge that rm characteristics may evolve di erently over time (for reasons outside the model) and impact multinational selection decisions di erentially. In particular, selection may be driven by lagged rm characteristics and decisions that could be correlated with future innovation. To address this, we use a propensity score estimator to reweight rms in equation (6) to reect di erences in the probability of being acquired based on prior characteristics.
We calculate the propensity score for each rm in the following way. For each year, we consider rms acquired in that year as treated observations and rms that are never acquired as control observations. We pool treated and control observations across all years, to estimate the probability that a rm is acquired as a function of a number of characteristics (see Lechner, 1999) . This estimated probability is the propensity score, b . The characteristics used to obtain the propensity score are lagged productivity (measured both by log rm sales and log labor productivity), lagged sales growth, lagged export status, lagged average wage, lagged innovation, lagged log capital per employee, lagged log capital and a year trend. We also allow for this relationship to vary across industries by estimating the propensity score separately for each industry. 25 One can transform the propensity score estimates into weights such that the propensity score reweighted regression yields a consistent estimate of a parameter of interest (Dehejia and Wahba, 1997; Busso, DiNardo and McCrary, 2009). We will obtain the Average Treatment E ect (ATE) of acquisition on innovation in a specication like equation (6) , using the weights derived from the propensity score (Rubin, 2001). Specically, the weight for each treated rm is 1 b , and the weight for each control rm is 1 (1 b ). 26 We restrict the analysis to rms that fall within the common support. Busso, DiNardo and McCrary (2009) show that the nite sample properties of this propensity score reweighting estimator are superior to the propensity score matching techniques (where each treated rm is matched to one or several controls).
The propensity score reweighting estimator obtained by reweighting observations in equation (6), allows us to control not only for selection on time-invariant characteristics of rms (just like the equal-weighted xed e ects regression), but also for time-varying characteristics through the propensity score. The underlying assumption in the estimation is that, conditional on observable time-varying and any time-invariant characteristics that a ect selection, treatment is random.
Hence, outcomes for the treated are attributable only to treatment status (this is typically referred to as the ignorability assumption, or selection on observables).
Acquired rms undertake more innovation
Since we have detailed information on the types of innovation implemented within domestic rms upon foreign acquisition, our data will allow us to shed light on the actual process of technology adoption by domestic rms, and precisely what types of innovations are more likely to be adopted/transferred.
Our measures of innovation are specic actions related to the implementation of product and process innovation, and the assimilation of foreign technology. All columns of Table 3 reect regressions of an innovation variable on the lagged foreign ownership variable. Reecting the fact that it takes some time for rm strategies to change after acquisition, we observe empirically that innovations take place mainly with a one-year lag. Lagging this independent variable also minimizes 25 We also performed the standard tests to check that the balancing hypothesis holds within each industry. We found that all covariates are balanced between treated and control observations for all blocks in all industries.
The relationship between each of these variables and the probability of being acquired is shown in Supplemental Appendix Table S2 . Lagged log rm sales is the most signicant predictor of acquisition, consistent with our model. 26 Since never-acquired control rms may be used as controls more than once, we sum the control weights by rm to obtain the weight for the control rm (Lechner, 1999) . We also winsorize the weights at one percent because of extreme outliers in the weights. The results are not sensitive to the exact outlier cut-o . possible concerns about reverse causation.
In Table 3 , we report the results for each investment proxy variable: process innovation (Panel A), product innovation (Panel B) and assimilation of foreign technologies (Panel C). The rst column in each panel includes only rm xed e ects; the second also includes a control for sales growth in the year prior to acquisition (to control for possible di erences in innovation related to previous rm growth); and the third allows for industry-level trends in investment. The fourth column presents the propensity score reweighted estimates.
The xed e ects specications in Columns 1 to 3 of Panel A show that process innovation is positively and signicantly associated with foreign ownership. Column 1a shows that a foreignacquired rm is 57-percent more likely to have undertaken a process innovation while foreignowned, relative to a rm that stays domestic. This estimate is robust to controlling for lagged sales growth (Column 2a) and industry trends (Column 3a). Column 4a shows the propensity score reweighted regressions that allow us to control for time-varying selection and other forms of endogeneity. The coe cient 0.645 is similar to earlier columns and also highly signicant, implying that rms undertake more process innovation upon acquisition.
There is also some evidence that foreign-acquired rms conduct more product innovation and are also more likely to assimilate foreign technology. However, while the coe cients are positive and signicant in Columns 1b and 1c, standard errors are larger when controls for lagged sales growth and industry trends are included, as is also true for the propensity score estimation. Nonetheless, the coe cient values on lagged foreign ownership remain similar in magnitude for each variable in these specications, and is signicant at the ten-percent level for the assimilation of foreign technologies in the propensity score estimation of Column 4b. 27 This suggests that the foreign parent is transferring new technologies upon acquisition. Table 4 shows the e ect of foreign ownership on the disaggregated measures of process innova- rms appear to introduce both types of innovations jointly, it is important to allow for the e ect of both actions when quantifying the multinational productivity advantage.
The Role of Market Access Provided by the Foreign Parent
These ndings on increased innovation following acquisition, together with our positive selection results, are consistent with a world in which multinationals choose to acquire the most productive rms since that is where the returns to their investment are highest. This could arise because the foreign rm gives access to technology at a cost ( ) that is lower than the innovation costs for the rm had it remained under domestic control, as previously proposed in the literature on the sources of multinational advantage (see Caves, 1996) . We highlight an alternative reason for our ndings, based on a key feature of multinationals: they often grant their subsidiaries access to a larger global market. Tables 5 and 6 explore whether innovation decisions are related to whether foreign ownership brings with it access to foreign markets. We regress the innovation variables on indicator variables for whether the rm exports, and for whether the rm exports through the foreign parent. Exporting through the foreign parent may mean that the rm uses the distribution channels and the networks of the foreign rm to export, or that it sells its goods directly to the foreign parent (as part of a global production system). The base category is that the rm exports via any other channel such as through its own means, using a Spanish specialized intermediary or cooperative export agreements with other rms. (Column 2a), which is also signicant, suggesting that the ownership mechanism outlined in this paper o ers an explanation for acquired rms' increased process innovation that is separate from the export channel.
Columns 3a and 4a introduce our key variable of interest, showing xed e ects regressions using process innovation as a dependent variable, where we include the indicator variables for whether the rm exports via the foreign parent. Notably, we nd that starting to export through a foreign parent has a large and signicant coe cient. This suggests that the market access provided by the foreign parent is a key driver of the increased process innovation associated with acquisition.
Since we can distinguish between di erent types of process innovation, we evaluate the type of process innovation exporters are more likely to undertake. Although exporting is, on average, not signicantly associated with the simultaneous introduction of new machines and new forms of organizing production (Column 1b), foreign-owned rms are more likely to engage in this type of process innovation (Column 2b). Column 3b shows that, similar to the process innovation results
in Column 3a, innovation is driven mainly by those foreign-owned exporters that export via the foreign parent. In contrast, we nd that exporting is signicantly associated with the introduction of new machines exclusively, while exporting through a foreign parent is not (unreported). This reinforces our ndings in Table 4 , which suggest that foreign ownership leads to a specic type of product innovation, which involves both new machines and new methods of organizing production.
Columns 5 to 8 in Table 5 present the propensity score results for the market access channel, allowing us to control for time-varying selection and endogeneity. Here, we consider the treatment to be starting to export through the foreign parent, and we recalculate the propensity score and the associated weights for each rm as described in Section 5.1. Column 5 shows that exporting through a foreign parent leads to more process innovation (Column 5a) and, in particular, to innovation that involves the introduction of new machines and organizational practices simultaneously (Column 5b). 28 This result holds when controlling for lagged foreign ownership (Column 6), exporting status, and their interaction (Columns 7 and 8). Table 6 shows the e ect of market access through the foreign parent on product innovation and the assimilation of foreign technologies. Both using xed e ects and the propensity score estimator, we nd that exporting via a foreign parent leads to more product innovation and the adoption of foreign technologies. These results shed light on those in Table 3 , where we found a statistically weaker relationship between foreign ownership and these two variables. Once we distinguish between foreign-owned rms that export via a foreign parent and those that do not, we see that those that use the parent as an export platform and, hence, have access to larger markets also invest in new products and adopt new foreign technologies.
Taken together, these results imply that when rms are acquired by a foreign parent, they increase innovation particularly when the parent rm provides access to export markets. The observed relationship between market access and innovation activity o ers further support for the mechanism outlined in Case 1, since only in that case is there a role for market access as a driver of innovation decisions. It also indicates that market access can itself provide a su cient reason for acquisition (even when foreign and domestic rms face similar variable innovation costs) when larger market access increases the potential benets from investment activity.
Exports and Wages
Finally, in Table 7 , we show other changes that take place within rms as a consequence of foreign ownership. We study how the share of exports in total sales (Panel A), the logarithm of total exports for exporters (Panel B) and the logarithm of average rm wage (computed as the total wage bill divided by the number of employees, Panel C) change with foreign acquisition. Columns 1 to 3 show the equal weighted xed e ects specication, and Column 4 shows the propensity score reweighted results.
We nd that the proportion of exports in total sales increases signicantly following foreign acquisition. The propensity score estimate in Column 4a shows that the share of exports is, on average, ve percentage points higher in each year for rms that are acquired compared to similar rms that are not acquired. We also nd that the volume of exports for exporters is 25-percent higher for exporters under foreign ownership (Column 4b). Finally, Panel C shows that average rm wage increases by six percent following acquisition. This result is driven by an increase in the total wage bill, rather than by a change in the number of employees (results unreported). This suggests that rms are increasing their wages and/or upgrading the skill of the workforce following foreign acquisition. Again, this result, is interesting in itself and consistent with the technology upgrading identied in the previous sections, to the extent that worker skill and technology are complements in the production function.
6 Foreign Ownership and Productivity Evolution and in new methods to organize production. Now we investigate the e ect of acquisition on rm productivity directly, as well as its consequences for the evolution of the distribution of productivity within industries.
Under the assumption that the investment activities described above are indeed productivityenhancing, the increased levels of these activities upon acquisition are predicted to lead to higher productivity for acquired rms. Table 8 shows the results of estimating equation (6) with our measures of productivity as the dependent variable. Column 1 in Panels A to C (for each productivity measure) estimate equation (6) without rm xed e ects; Columns 2 and 3 include rm xed e ects and industry trends, respectively; and Column 4 shows the propensity score reweighting estimates.
The point estimates are much larger in the cross-sectional estimation of Column 1 relative to any of the other columns that include xed e ects and better control for selection and endogeneity using the propensity score. This reects the fact that the positive selection identied earlier will lead to substantial over-estimation of the productivity advantage in cross-sectional analysis (as also demonstrated by Criscuolo and Martin, 2009 ). However, we also nd that acquisition is signicantly positively associated with increased productivity, controlling for selection. The propensity score reweighted specications in Column 4 imply that, after acquisition, real sales increase by 18 percent, on average, for acquired rms. In turn, labor productivity is 13-percent higher and TFP is 16-percent higher for acquired rms.
There are a number of concerns about using measures of productivity based on accounting variables that this paper shares with most of the productivity literature. If there are changes in how some costs (e.g., management) are allocated between establishments in a rm, or in how input or output prices are accounted for (e.g., when using transfer pricing), the accounting-based measures of productivity can be problematic. One advantage of our paper is that we are able to measure actual changes in the technology that goes directly into the production function (our measures of innovation and technology adoption in Section 5), such that we do not have to rely exclusively on productivity measures to evaluate the e ects of foreign ownership. Note, also, that the introduction of transfer pricing upon acquisition would make it harder for us to nd any productivity e ects of acquisition since the transfer price within a multinational is likely to be smaller than the market price, reducing reported sales volumes. In any case, the productivity results in Table 8 conrm the results that we obtained in Table 3 using direct measures of the changes in the technologies entering the production function and a ecting productivity. 29 Finally, we discuss the implications of our ndings for the evolution of the distribution of productivity within industries. We showed that foreign rms are more likely to acquire the most productive rms within industries ( Table 2 ), and that, upon acquisition, rms innovate (Table 3) , increasing productivity (Table 8 ). This set of results implies that acquisition activity can lead to an increase in the dispersion of the productivity distribution. 30 One can see this in Figure 5 , which shows the distribution of rm productivity in the base year, and four years after that, for rms that are domestic in that rst year but will be foreign-owned four years later. The distribution is shifted to the right, indicating that productivity increased for rms following the acquisition, over the whole distribution of rm initial productivity. Figure 6 shows the distribution of productivity in the base year and four years later for rms that remained domestic. While there is a slight increase in productivity (productivity is generally known to increase over time), it is much less pronounced than for foreign-acquired rms. Thus, Figures 5 and 6 provide evidence that the dispersion in the productivity distribution will increase with foreign entry. This is an important consequence of our earlier ndings since it has implications for the evolution of within-industry productivity distributions as more foreign rms enter an industry. Under this mechanism, foreign entry does not lead to productivity convergence, but, on the contrary, could lead to further divergence. Of course, there could be other reasons (such as spillover e ects or other externalities) why multinational entry may improve less productive rms' productivity. However, the direct e ect of the foreign acquisition process is an increase in productivity heterogeneity.
Conclusion
In this paper, we use rich and detailed data on Spanish manufacturing rms to establish that foreign rms acquire the best rms within industries ("cherry-picking"), but, nonetheless, also invest more in a number of innovation activities upon acquisition. In particular, controlling for the selection e ect, rms increase both their process innovation (with the simultaneous introduction of new 29 All our results are robust to the analysis of rms that report no change in reporting unit throughout the time they are in the sample, as well as restricting the sample to rms that report no changes in the number of establishments. This rules out the concern that the denition of the reporting unit changes following acquisition. 30 If multinational entry also serves to raise the threshold level of productivity at which rms exit the domestic market (as in Helpman et. al., 2004) , the resulting productivity distribution will shift to the right, but the increase in dispersion following multinational entry will be less pronounced. machines and organizational practices) and their product innovation. Firms also report that they assimilate more foreign technologies upon acquisition.
We develop a simple model that illustrates how these two facts are fundamentally related. The model relies on standard assumptions about rm production, heterogeneity, consumer demand and market competition (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Melitz, 2003 ) and incorporates two well-known characteristics of multinational rms: multinationals grant access to larger markets and/or have lower technology implementation costs. Since the incentives for innovation and acquisition are increasing in initial productivity, foreign rms would nd it more protable to acquire the most productive rms, and innovate more on acquisition.
The observed positive selection suggests that there are complementarities between innovation activity and the initial characteristics of the acquired rm that could go beyond any possible technological complementarity between rms with similar productivity levels. Our results also suggest there is a complementarity between market access and innovation. Taken together, these ndings can explain a number of important facts: rst, why more productive rms innovate more; second, why foreign rms acquire the most productive rms within industries; and third, why foreign-owned rms increase their innovation upon acquisition.
It is, perhaps, not surprising that integration into a foreign multinational is associated with higher levels of innovation since transaction costs theories of the rm suggest that the reason for integration in the rst place is to achieve the e ciently high levels of investment that arm's length transacting would preclude. 31 Our contribution is to illustrate the drivers of the innovation process and to highlight that superior or proprietary technologies are not necessary to generate the prediction that a given rm nds it optimal to invest more under foreign control than under domestic control.
In addition, the complementarity between market scale and innovation o ers one explanation for why all rms do not imitate the practices of high productivity rms in the market and why productivity di erences persist. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to link market scale to the jointly determined acquisition outcomes and innovation incentives. Finally, while we focus on the multinational rm's acquisition choice, the economic mechanism we emphasize should also be relevant for purely domestic integration decisions when the acquirer facilitates access to larger markets. 31 The reason why a foreign rm chooses to enter via acquisition rather than through an arm's length relationship is the subject of a large literature and typically requires some form of contractual incompleteness. While our model allows for this possibility, our predictions hold even without contractual incompleteness around the technology transfer in itself. ms.
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by industry) o l pdf of initia of al Figure 5 : Distribution of Productivity for Acquired Firms, Before and After the Foreign Acquisition.
Note: The dashed line shows the empirical pdf of initial productivity (measured by log sales demeaned by industry) of firms that are domestic at time t, but will become foreign-owned by time t+4. The bold line shows the empirical pdf of productivity of these firms at time t+4 (i.e., after acquisition). Note: The dashed line shows the empirical pdf of initial productivity (measured by log sales demeaned by industry) of firms that are domestic at time t and will stay domestic at time t+4. The bold line shows the empirical pdf of productivity of these firms at time t+4. Sales is the natural logarithm of the firm's real sales. Base year ln Sales is the natural logarithm of firm's real sales, relative to the industry mean, in the first year the firm appears in the sample. Ln Labor productivity is the natural logarithm of real value added per worker (where valued added is calculated by ESEE as the sum of sales plus change in inventory, less purchases and costs of goods sold). Base year ln Labor productivity is the natural logarithm of real value added per worker, relative to the industry mean, in the first year the firm appears in the sample. Ln TFP is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity and Base year ln TFP is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity in the base year, calculated using the approach of Olley and Pakes (1996) , relative to the industry mean, in the first year the firm reports it. Process Innovation, Product Innovation, Assimilation of Foreign Technologies, New Machines, New Methods of Organizing Production, and Both are all defined in a similar way, and reflect the stock of reported innovations of each type the firm has done during the sample period (see Sections 3 and 5 for more details). Export is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm exports any goods. Export via foreign parent is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm declares it exports through a foreign parent. Exports/Sales is the share of exports over total sales. Ln Exports is the natural logarithm of exports. Ln Average wage is the natural logarithm of the total wage bill per worker. All nominal variables are in 1990 euros (deflated using the industry-level producer price index -Indice de Precios Industriales). Notes: Foreign is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has at least 50-percent foreign ownership. Base year (lagged) ln Sales is the natural logarithm of firm's real sales, relative to the industry mean, in the first year the firm appears in the sample (one year prior to the dependent variable). Base year (lagged) labor productivity is the natural logarithm of real value added per worker, relative to the industry mean, in the first year the firm appears in the sample (one year prior to the dependent variable). Base year (lagged) ln TFP is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity, calculated using the approach of Olley and Pakes (1996) , relative to the industry mean, in the first year the firm reports it (one year prior to the dependent variable). Exporting firm in base year equals one if the firm was an exporter in the first year it appears in the sample. Lag Exporting firm equals one if the firm was an exporter the previous year. The first year the firm appears in the sample is dropped from all regressions. All columns include year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance. 
Productivity Measure
Evidence from Panel Data and Propensity Score Weighting
Notes: Export is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm exports any goods. Export via foreign parent is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm declares it exports through a foreign parent. Foreign is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has at least 50% foreign ownership. The dependent variables are our measures of innovation (see Section 3 for details). All columns include year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance.
Product Innovation Notes: Foreign is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has at least 50-percent foreign ownership. Exports/Sales is the share of exports over total sales. Ln Exports is the natural logarithm of exports. Ln Average wage is the natural logarithm of the total wage bill per worker. The first year the firm appears in the sample is dropped from all regressions. All columns include year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance. Notes: Foreign is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has at least 50-percent foreign ownership. ln Sales is the natural logarithm of firm's real sales. Ln Labor productivity is the natural logarithm of real value added per worker. Ln TFP (Olley Pakes) is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity, calculated using the approach of Olley and Pakes (1996) . The first year the firm appears in the sample is dropped from all regressions. All columns include year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance. Column 1 presents univariate probit regressions of the Foreign ownership dummy on the set of lagged variables used in the propensity score estimation, on all industries pooled (for the results shown in the paper, we estimate the propensity score by industry, to allow for different coefficients on the included variables). Column 2 presents the multivariate probit regression using the same variables, on all industries pooled. All regressions include industry dummies. The right-hand side variables are highly correlated, so that when we run the multivariate regression many of them become insignificant. Notice that lagged firm sales is the most significant determinant, consistent with our model.In the paper, the propensity score weights are obtained by estimating the multivariate regression for each industry separately. All regressors are balanced in all industries using the set of covariates in Column 2. When we used a more parsimonious specification, with fewer variables, some of the regressors were not balanced across blocks in some industries. These results are shown in Table S3 , for a simpler specification of the propensity score. This Table re-estimates the propensity score regressions in the paper, using a parsimonious specification for the propensity score that only includes Lagged firm sales, Lagged labor productivity and year as controls when calculating the score. The score is again calculated by industry, to allow for differences across industries in the coefficients. In this case, the covariates are not balanced in some industries and blocks, which is why we chose a richer specification for the paper, where all covariates are balanced. However, as can be seen in the table, the result s are fairly robust when using this simpler specification for the score. 
